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Abstract
Information security is the most challenging aspect of information processing. Organizations, governments, and individuals are
facing many information security risks. These risks can cause serious damages that might lead to signiﬁcant ﬁnancial losses, breach
of the conﬁdentiality of sensitive information, or loss of integrity or availability of sensitive data. To facilitate eﬀective protection
of information, a better identiﬁcation, understanding, and assessment of security threat and their characteristics are crucial for
system security managers. In order to deﬁne and then assess security threats, we propose a new threat identiﬁcation approach on
which we build a quantitative security risk model for information systems. The proposed model is systematic, extendable, and
modular. The aim is to help managers accurately assess security threat in an incremental and comprehensive way.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
With the development of information and communication technologies and increasing accessibility to the Internet,
information systems became more open to the external world and therefore more vulnerable to threats originating
specially from outside their boundaries. The potential of a given threat in exploiting vulnerabilities of a system and,
thereby causing harm to an organization and its systems, determines the risk that the organization needs to remedy.
Because a signiﬁcant number of losses come from smaller-scale security incidents, which are due to underestimating
information system security risks14, the ﬁnancial losses caused by security breaches usually cannot precisely be
evaluated8 9 11 12 13. However, we ﬁnd in the literature several reports on the cost related to security breaches3,15.
These reports on the cost of security breaches are needed by managers to assess the costs they might incur should a
security risk materializes.
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A risk is a function of the likelihood of threat events occurrence and potential adverse impact should the event
occur16. Risk assessment or risk analyzing is the process of identifying, estimating, and prioritizing information secu-
rity risks. Assessing risk requires a careful analysis of threat and vulnerability of information to determine the extent
to which circumstances or events could adversely impact an organization and the likelihood that such circumstances
or events will occur16. Security risk analysis focuses on analyzing vulnerabilities and threats to the information re-
sources and deciding what countermeasures to take for reducing risk to an acceptable level. As information become
exposed to risks originating from within or from outside threats, organizations are under pressure to make better se-
curity investment and policy decisions related to information security in order to protect their assets. Indeed, as the
environment continues to become more dynamic the process of making good security decisions is becoming more and
more challenging. Hence, managers have to adopt successful policies and practices to prevent security breaches which
require individuals at all levels in the organization to assume the responsibility for making a decision that exposes the
organization to potential harm9.
Threats come from diﬀerent sources, such as employees activities or hackers attacks. It may be manifested via a
threat agent using a particular penetration technique to cause undesired eﬀects4 14 18. Thus, managers need to know
and ﬁnd threats that inﬂuence their assets and identify their impact to determine what they need to do to prevent
attacks by selecting appropriate countermeasure. Then, they need to evaluate the extent of the damage they inﬂict to
the organization and its systems. Based on the obtained assessment, they conceive policies and measures to prevent or
mitigate the damage. However, in order to select appropriate countermeasures, it is necessary to have an understanding
of the threats and the vulnerabilities. Security threat classiﬁcation allows detecting, understanding, and evaluating
threats in order to propose appropriate security solutions. In fact, security threats can be observed and classiﬁed in
diﬀerent ways by considering diﬀerent aspects of the system like its source code, or its users or their roles. The
main aim of threats classiﬁcations is to contribute to the understanding of the nature of threats by accurately deﬁning
threats and their characteristics. Moreover, threat classiﬁcations help to assess and evaluate threat impacts which
help developing strategies to mitigate the eﬀects of the threats on the system13 17. There are several known computer
system attack classiﬁcations and taxonomies7 8 13 14 18. We notice that many researchers have proposed taxonomies
that classify attacks based on the intended eﬀect of the attack like a denial of service attacks10 and others incorporate
the technique used by the attackers, such as bypassing authentication or authority4 14 17. However, these classiﬁcations
are neither complete nor systematic in considering threats. They do not provide a full coverage of at least a view of
the threat world nor do they provide us with a methodic approach to consider other threats.
The main contributions of this paper are a new approach to threat classiﬁcation and a quantitative analysis of
information systems based on it. The proposed approach leads to a security assessment model that is systematic,
extendable, and modular. We use this model to illustrate how a quantitative risk analysis of a system can be carried.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give an overview of threat classiﬁcation and
we present a model for threat classiﬁcation that allow classifying threats in an orthogonal way. Then, we propose
our multidimensional approach to assess security threats based on security threat dimensions. In the conclusion, we
summarize the main characteristics of our approach and we brieﬂy give the highlights of our future work.
2. World Threat Morphology: Perspectives and Dimensions
A classiﬁcation of the world of security threats is a segmentation of this world according to each of its dimensions,
where a dimension can be deﬁned as an elementary aspect or extent of the threat word. For instance, it could be a spa-
cial segmentation, a temporal segmentation, or a combined spatio-temporal segmentation. Some of these dimensions
can shade light on our understanding of the risks that a system is exposed to. The security threat world for a system
is nothing but the world in which it is deployed. A system has a location or it is distributed on several locations,
therefore it has a space dimension. The system has time related to its behaviour therefore it has a time dimension. It
has a component dimension that is formed by the set of its components, and topological dimension that encompasses
the connectors relating the components. It has as well its user dimension that encompasses all its classes of users
and their roles. It evolves in an environment that by itself has several dimensions. These dimension in the system
environment could include its partner applications, the systems that collaborate with it to achieve its function or the
quality of its function, or the systems that supply it for example with power or cooling, or other resources that it relies
on either directly or indirectly. When a system is distributed on several legal jurisdictions, some of them might allow
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Fig. 1. Illustrative example of the relationship between a perspective and its dimensions
or require practices that weaken that part of the system or can provide intruders with gates to the rest of the system.
Therefore, the legal jurisdictions on which a classical or a cloud system is distributed form a dimension that ought to
be considered when assessing the security risks related to distributed systems. Similarly, we can have a managerial
culture dimension when the system is tuned for and deployed in an environment that presents several managerial
cultures.
These dimensions are orthogonal. When a threat is assessed from two orthogonal dimension, for instance space
and time, we can have a better assessment than when we consider only one of the two dimensions. For illustration,
let us consider that our information system is deployed onto locations A, B, and C. First, let us consider only the
location dimension and assume that the threat on location C has a deemed acceptable average (time-wise) cost of cl.
However, when we consider the space and time dimensions together, the threat on the information system at location
C is assessed among others at some speciﬁc critical times of the year. Then, we discover for example that a system
shutdown or unavailability on the days allocated for ﬁscal year-end processing could lead to more signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
losses. In the latter case, the manager can has better plan for recovery actions should the system becomes unavail-
able on these days. He would have more accurate costs associated to location C than the average cost cl obtained by
considering only the space dimension. In the case when taking only the location dimension, the manager is working
with an average cost that might seem acceptable, but not as accurate to represent some critical times in the business
life of the system. Hence, to ensure excellence in security management and planning, we need an approach to the
classiﬁcation of security threats that takes into account as many dimensions of the world of the system as deemed
practically acceptable. The more dimensions we consider, the ﬁner is our assessment and our understanding of the
characteristics of the threats. With a ﬁner assessment of the security threats, we can better plan to reduce their induced
losses. In4 17, we ﬁnd that even threat classiﬁcations that are done without a clear multi-dimensional decomposition
help us in articulating the security risks that surround the considered systems, enhancing secure programming prac-
tices to prevent security issues during application development, or in assisting in understanding the capabilities and
selection of web security solutions.
2.1. Key Features of the Proposed Multidimentional Approach
The proposed multi-dimensional approach to the classiﬁcation of security threats helps arrange security threats
according to the dimensions considered. Since it is based on the principle of separation of concern, it provides a sys-
tematic study of the threats. A security analyst might start by considering the threats from the view of one dimension
(e.g. space –location–), then reﬁnes her assessment of the threat risks by involving another dimensions. Then, she
further ﬁne tune the risk assessment by considering additional dimensions. Therefore, the proposed approach can be
used in an incremental way regarding the considered dimensions. Alternatively, one can assess the threats from several
510   Mouna Jouini et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  52 ( 2015 )  507 – 514 
somewhat related dimensions forming a perspective. For instance, we combine threat assessment from the perspective
of the locations, the architectural components, and their connectors in one set giving an architectural perspective. In
another set the analyst can take the perspective of partner applications, open source software used, and detailed design
solutions such as encryption algorithm used embedded within a module.
In our context, a perspective is a focused view of the threat world that encompasses some related dimensions of
the system’s threat world. It is a subjective evaluation of relative signiﬁcance that gives a point of view on the world
of threats on information systems. One can also say that a perspective gives a view of the whole threat world in
lesser dimensions than it encompasses in reality. Fig. 1 illustrates how a perspective is further decomposed into a
set of orthogonal dimensions. In the ﬁgure, the architectural perspective is decomposed into connectors dimension,
deployment sites dimension, and a dimension formed by the set of the software elements/components of the considered
system.
3. Characteristics of the Multidimensional Approach
3.1. Dealing with Change in the System Domain
A system threat world changes constantly. Any shift in the external or internal situation of an information system
represents a change that leads to a new assessment and therefore requires that we update our assessment of the security
threats. Therefore, to quickly and systematically deal with these changes, the threat classiﬁcation needs to abide by
the principle of separation of concerns that separates the aspects that are more likely to change together into a separate
class. The proposed approach provides a multidimensional classiﬁcation that adopts this principle. For example, a
change in the deployment of the system would likely aﬀect only the space/location dimension of the system. A change
in the human resources and the role of the users would aﬀect only the security from the user dimension. Therefore, it
is easy to change the classiﬁcation and quickly reassess the threats based on the dimensions concerned by the change,
while the rest remains the same. We therefore, have a methodical and systematic way to change our classiﬁcation
based on the nature of the change in the threat world of the system. It is therefore easy to have well deﬁned process to
manage the eﬀect of changes within and around the system. The process should encompass the identiﬁcation of the
dimensions of the change and then changing the assessment according to only these dimensions.
3.2. Enhanced Tuning of Threat Assessment
Some changes might need the tuning of the threat assessment, which can be obtained in two ways separately or
combined. The ﬁrst is obtained by a ﬁner decomposition of the elements of one dimension. These kind of changes are
very often predictable. For example, a location in which the system is deployed is decomposed further into several
zones that exhibit diﬀerent threat costs. Or, suppose that we have the connectors used in the architecture of our
information system which decomposed in the following classes: procedure call, data access, event, stream, linkage,
distributor, arbitrator, and adaptor. When reconsidering the architectural perspective of the classiﬁcation, we might
want to further reﬁne the class of connector using procedure call into two classes: call by reference and call by value.
The second way to ﬁne tune the threat classiﬁcation is obtained by adding a complete new dimension that was not
considered before. Let us assume that before the world knows about Heartbleed Bug, we did not consider including
the security partner application in the classiﬁcation of the threats faced by our system. Once aware that partner
applications such as OpenSSL cryptographic software library play a role in the threats to our system, we decide to add
a new dimension for security related partner applications that includes the set of libraries and virtual machines used
by the system to ensure its security. Therefore, the proposed approach deals well with predictable or unpredictable
changes in the system’s threat world and that in a systematic way without the need for changing the assessments
related to other unaﬀected dimensions.
3.3. Merits of our approach compared to existing threat classiﬁcations and taxonomies
Several threat taxonomies have been presented in the literature. For instance, paper1 classiﬁes the faults that may
aﬀect a system during its life according to their phase of creation (development or operation), system boundaries,
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cause, dimension (considering only hardware and software), objective (malicious or not), intent (deliberate or not),
capacity (accidental or not), and persistence. The authors call these classes elementary faults. While faults can be one
aspect to take into account in assessing security threats, only around 25% of security breaches are due to glitches in
the software system or its partner applications7 18. We cannot ﬁnd in1 why only these classes are to be considered; no
evidences on the completeness of the list of classes. Therefore, we should be considering other aspects to get a full
view of security threats.
Other classiﬁcations give partial classiﬁcations that are articulated around one or two dimensions of the threat
work7 18. For instance, we ﬁnd in5 three classes of threats: network, severs, and applications. One can see that these
classes are architectural threats (i.e elements on the architectural dimension). In4, a taxonomy is proposed to describe
cyber conﬂict events and the actors involved in them. Elements of the taxonomy are either events or entities and
are then subdivided using the categories and subcategories of actions or actors. The authors aim was to propose an
organized model that can be used to measure the impact of attacks and diﬀerent defence strategies against security
threats. The proposed model is entity and event centered; it takes into account only the actors in the environment of
the system that are involved in a cyber conﬂict and the events that happen in the environment of the system. In our
opinion, this is a narrow perspective in examining the security of our information systems.
We ﬁnd in the literature6 a methodology for identifying and evaluating information security risks named Octave
Allegro that is articulated around eight steps. One of these steps (Step 3) is related to the present work and is about
identifying information asset containers. An asset container is deﬁned in6 as places or channels used for storing,
transporting or processing information. Users are considered as information containers. In our proposed model,
information containers form at the most one of the perspectives of the system’s threat world. Octave Allegro does not
explicitly consider other dimensions that might aﬀect the integrity, availably, or conﬁdentiality of information.
We can ﬁnd several other classiﬁcations that exhibit some classes without clear rationale for why they consider
them and how they provide a partitioning of the threat world. In summary, despite that a great deal of previous work
has been done in the area of classifying threats and vulnerabilities, the proposed taxonomies and classiﬁcations lack
a guiding line for making them systematic, complete (at least with regards to a set of perspectives), and extendable
specially when their user wishes to add new perspectives that their relevance is recently put to light. Our sought threat
assessment approach is designed to consider several orthogonal views in the security threat world. It is intended to be
extensible so that users can add new perspectives as the need for them is revealed. We conjecture that this approach
can be as speciﬁc as necessary for various purposes.
4. Multidimensional Mean Failure Cost Assessment
In this section, we adopt the multidimensional approach to assess security threats, we propose a method for assess-
ing the cost of the failure of an information system security. In this assessment we consider several threat perspectives
each having several orthogonal dimensions.
4.1. The Mean Failure Cost
In2, Ben Aissa et al. introduced the concept of Mean Failure Cost (MFC) as a measure of dependability in general,
and a measure of the cost induced by a lack of cyber security in particular. For each stakeholder, the MFC quantiﬁes
the cost of loss that results from security threats and system vulnerabilities. It varies depending on several factors such
as a stakeholder’s incurred costs for not meeting a security requirement, the discrepancy between failure cost related to
the requirements, the discrepancy between failure probability associated to components, and the discrepancy between
failure impacts as perceived by stakeholders. The MFC model does not consider any classiﬁcation threats and it does
not take into account any threat perspective. It takes a global view at the threats targeting the components of a system.
In2, the components of a system represent only one dimension in the architectural perspective of the threat world. As
discussed above there are several other dimensions that ought to be considered. In the following, we extend the MFC
model to obtain a more comprehensive model. We propose a quantitative assessment model that extends the MFC
model to several threat perspectives.
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4.2. A Multi-dimension Mean Failure Cost Model (M2FC): A Measure of Cybersecurity
As discussed in Section 2, security threats when materialized raises major risks to computer systems. Any security
threat presents several aspects that increase the risk level faced by a system. Indeed, information systems may execute
their transactions at multiple sites while data can be stored in several other sites. A security breach may occur in any
of these sites. Due to their distributed architecture, such systems are prone to several threats. These threats have many
dimensions as mentioned above and we need to assess and estimate the cost incurred when they materialized.
While the world threat is multidimensional, we would like to decompose this space into several two-dimensional
slices. The aim is easing the assessment of mean failure cost by reaching values relative to the interaction of only two
dimensions. The advantage is to allow managers to have a clear picture of the costs by looking to the aﬀect of the
interactions of the dimensions two by two rather than having a complex picture that involves several dimension all
together. A complex picture while gives a more accurate values, it does not clearly reveal the dimension that is more
sensitive to the mean failure cost. Managers would like to identify the dimension that increases the mean failure cost
in order to invest in further shielding its elements against security threats.
For the decomposition purpose of world threat, we need to chose a leading dimension. It is a dimension that is
used to guide our decomposition of the multidimensional threat world into several slices of two dimensions each.
For instance, we can opt for the deployment dimension as the leading dimension. Then, we can consider another
dimension to go with it to form a two-dimension view. For example, we can chose to take the deployment dimension
and the component dimension, or the deployment dimension and the partner applications dimension. The ﬁrst one
gives us the mean failure costs relative to a stakeholder with regard to the components of a site, while the second gives
the mean failure costs relative to a stakeholder with regard to the partner applications per site. In these two cases, the
deployment component of the information system that encompasses the sites on which the system is deployed plays
the role of the leading dimension.
The role of the leading dimension is extremely important for assessing the cost related to security threats. It allow
to focus more on one dimension than the rest of the dimension of the threat world. For example, to assess the mean
failure cost per site we choose the deployment dimension as the leading one. In other situations, we would like to
focus not on sites but on managerial zones within the space of the enterprise, then we will have the mean failure cost
per managerial zone. In other situations, it could be more appropriate for the manager to take as leading dimension
the operational period of the enterprise (for example low season, high season), or consider the classes of partner
application of the system.
As illustrative example, we use a computational model that estimates the security of a system in terms of the loss
that each stakeholder incurs due to security breaches considering several dimensions within the threat world. When
considering the deployment dimension, we give the mean failure cost per deployment site where a security breach
occurs. The basic idea is to consider threat perspectives to estimate security failure.
The proposed Multidimensional Mean Failure Cost (M2FC) assessment model takes into account the stakeholders
assessment of the cost related to their requirements with regard to the elements of two dimensions. So, we can say that
the model is stakeholder based. That is why, in the following model, the set H of stakeholders and the set R of their
requirements are distinguished from the set of the leading dimension and the set of the other considered dimension.
4.2.1. Formulation of the Multidimensional Mean Failure Cost
Let S be the set of elements in the leading dimension, D be the set of elements of the other considered dimension,
H be the set of stakeholders, R is a set of requirements, and T be a set of threats. For every element s ∈ S , we deﬁne
the Multidimension Mean Failure Costs M(s,D) of element s as follows:
M(s,D) = Vs ◦ PFRs ◦Cs ◦ Ps, where (1)
1. We denote by ◦ the matrix multiplication operation.
2. Vs is a matrix of size |H | × |R| that each entry (i, j) represents the value of the stake that stakeholder Hi has in
meeting requirement Rj. We denote by |H| (resp. |R|) the size of the set H (resp. R).
3. PFRs is a matrix of size (|R|, |D|) that each entry (i, j) represents the probability of failing requirement Ri due to
a failure originating from element d j ∈ D.
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4. Cs is a matrix of size (|D|, |T |) that each entry (i, j) represents the probability that an element di ∈ D fails once the
threat t j has materialized.
5. Ps is a column vector of size |T | that each entry i represents the probability that threats materialize during unitary
period of operation.
If we consider S as a set of sites on which the system is deployed, and D is the set of components located in the site
s ∈ S , then M(s,D) gives the Multidimensional Mean Failure Cost for the components of the site s. If we change Cs to
be the set of partner applications used/located at the site s, then M(s,D) gives the Multidimensional Mean Failure Cost
for the partner applications of site s. One as well can change the leading dimension from the set of sites to operational
time periods (such as oﬀ-season, normal season, and peak season), or another dimension suitable for being a leading
dimension. Security Analysts will be considering a leading dimension S and several other dimensions D ∈ D. For
each D ∈ D and a number |S | of M(s,D) is obtained.
4.2.2. Illustrative Example
We illustrate the usage of the proposed M2FC model using an example to estimate the security of a system in
terms of loss incurred by each stakeholder. We take into account the architectural perspective in which we consider
the deployment sites dimension and the components (or architectural components) dimension. Our assessment varies
according to the stakes that each stakeholder has in meeting each security requirement per system site. In this case,
we opt for using the deployment dimension (i.e., sites dimension) as the leading dimension. For each site of the
considered system, we have the lists of stakeholders, security requirements, components, and threats.
We assume that the considered system is deployed on two sites. We have S = {S ite1, S ite2} and the component
dimension D has the following elements which is equals to D = {Browser,Web server, Proxy server}. We recognize
two stakeholders for this example namely: local user and external user. We consider as well the set R of requirements
to include the three facets of security R = {Availability, Integrity,Conﬁdentiality}. We consider that we dealing with
the set T = {Virus,Data Bases Attacks,Denial of service} of threats
Table 1. Stakes: cost of failing a security requirement
Security Requirement
Availability Conﬁdentiality Integrity
Local user 0.5 $K/h 0.9 $K/h 0.9$K/h
External user 0.03$K/h 0.04$K/h 0.9$K/h
Table 2. Probabilities of failure requirements per site
Components
Site 1 Site 2
Browser Web Server Proxy Server No Failure (NoF) Browser Web Server No Failure (NoF)
Availlability 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5
Conﬁdentiality 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.7
Integrity 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6
Table 3. Probabilities of failure components matrix for sites
Threats
Site 1 Site 2
Virus Data Bases Attacks No Threat (NoT) Virus Data Bases Attacks Denial of Service (DoS) No Threat (NoT)
Browser 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5
Web Server 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.35 0.1 0.35
Proxy Server 0.3 0.6 0.1 – – – –
No Failure (NoF) 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.11 0.2 0.09 0.6
We assume that both locations have the same stakeholders and the same security requirements. Table 1 gives the
values of the matrix of stakes Vs. Each site has its proper components and it is prone to various security threats as
shown in Table 2, which gives the values of matrix PFRs. Tables 3 and 4 give the values of matrix Cs and the vector
Ps. Using this data, we compute the vector of Multidimension Mean Failure Costs M(S ite,Component) (shown in Table 5)
for the components of each site. It is a direct usage of equation 1.
Table 4. Threats probabilities occurrence vector for sites
Threats ProbabilitySite 1 Site 2
Virus 0.03 0.04
Data Bases Attacks 0.02 0.015
Denial of Service (DoS) – 0.05
No Threat (NoT) 0.95 0.840
Table 5. Stakeholders Multidimension Mean Failure Cost
for sites considering the dimension Component.
Stakeholders M
2FC ($K/h)
Site 1 Site 2
Local user 0.7914 1.1611
External user 0.2749 0.4503
Table 5 shows that Site 2 has higher mean failure cost values than Site 1. It is an indication that stakeholders using
Site 2 can incur higher costs than when using Site 1.
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5. Conclusion
Information security is a critical problem for individuals and organizations because it leads to great ﬁnancial losses.
This work presents a new approach to threat assessment. The proposed threat decomposition adopted for the assess-
ment is systematic, extendable, modular, and leads to a quantitative security risk model of information systems. It
presents an extendable threat classiﬁcation model that eases the deﬁnition of threat characteristics to select appropri-
ate security decisions by combining various threats dimensions. Moreover, we propose a quantitative security risk
assessment model based on threats dimensions to estimate accurately the cost for security threat failure. This quanti-
tative model enables system’s stakeholders to quantify the risks they take with the security of their assets regarding to
several threat dimensions, which enables organizations make appropriate security decisions. It also enables managers
to have a clear picture of the costs by looking to the aﬀect of the interactions of the dimensions two by two and, hence,
gives a more accurate values of the mean failure cost. In addition, the model helps managers to identify the dimension
that increases the mean failure cost in order to invest in further shielding its elements against security threats.
Our future work aims at ranking the elements of a leading dimension based on the obtained M2FC values obtained
from several dimensions. The ranking will be done based on a selection of ranking algorithms. Also, we plan
further study of the M2FC model as a measurement in order to identify its measurement scale and its corresponding
admissible transformations. We aims also at applying it to a cloud system and build the needed machinery to support
the automation of the multidimensional quantitative assessment of security threats.
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